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Determinants of Risk Reporting by Portuguese and Spanish Non-
finance Companies 
Abstract 
Purpose – The paper seeks to assess the risk reporting practices across two European 
Latin countries (Portugal and Spain). Moreover, drawn on elements of agency, 
legitimacy, resources-based perspectives, and institutional theory this study also intends 
to assess if the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on risk reporting is 
mediated by strategic/institutional legitimacy interests. 
Design/methodology/approach – From a sample of 60 non-finance Portuguese and 
Spanish companies with securities traded on the Euronext Lisbon stock exchange 
market and on the Madrid stock exchange market, respectively, at December, 2011, the 
Corporate Governance reports and the “risk/risk management” sections of the 
Management reports included on consolidated annual reports for 2011 were manually 
content analyzed, according to prior literature. Further, multiple linear regressions were 
used to assess the potential relationships between corporate governance mechanisms 
and risk reporting. 
Findings – Results indicate that visible companies, operating in a country with a 
weaker legal environment, and during periods of financial distress disclose more 
discretionary RRD, basically to contextualize their negative outcomes. Some corporate 
governance mechanisms were crucial to improve risk information.  
Originality – The paper goes beyond prior literature work and assesses if the theoretical 
framework grounded on agency, legitimacy, resources-based perspective, and 
institutional theory is suitable in explaining RRD in an under-researched setting 
(European Latin countries, such as Portugal and Spain with low agency costs and 
different corporate governance models). Moreover, the analysis embraces a wider and 
homogeneous range of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and uses 
a period in which both countries were severely affected by a sovereign debt crisis with 
negative impacts on company’s liquidity and financial risks. A research setting like this 
has not been studied hitherto. 
 
Keywords – Risk reporting, corporate governance, agency theory, legitimacy theory, 
resources-based perspectives, institutional theory 
Paper type – Research paper 
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Introduction 
Some of the main attributes of risk-related disclosures (RRD) are its ability in reducing 
information asymmetries (Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; Dobler et al., 2011; Greco, 2012), in 
providing insights on companies’ risk exposures and risk management policies (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 2008), and in assessing company’s risk profile and future 
performance (Dobler et al., 2011; Greco, 2012). Lower levels of RRD may be 
associated with disclosure costs (Linsley and Shrives, 2006), its commercial 
sensitiveness (Dobler, 2008), and potential litigation costs (ICAEW, 1998; Oliveira et 
al., 2011). But other incentives for RRD may be associated with lower cost of capital 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006), corporate reputation management (Oliveira et al., 2011), 
and institutional logics (Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2015). 
 However, prior literature has found that RRD is not useful for stakeholders 
because: a) is neither detailed nor precise (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili and 
Zéghal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2006); b) risk explanations are qualitative, 
backward-looking, are not aligned with strategy, do not incorporate a clear distinction 
between controllable and non-controllable risks, and limitations of risk 
management/measurement models are not disclosed (Solomon et al., 2000; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Abraham et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2013); c) and they 
are difficult to read (Linsley and Lawrence, 2007). More recently, the global financial 
crisis highlighted some accounting shortcomings, including failure to account for 
uncertainty and inadequate communication of the impact of risk-taking, thereby 
undermining the reliability and relevance of disclosures (Magnan and Markarian, 2011). 
 To overcome this lack of transparency regulation has been used to improve RRD 
(Solomon et al., 2000; Dobler, 2008). Greco (2012) emphasizes that regulation can 
require adequate risk management systems and mandate risk reporting. However, no 
single set of accounting and non-accounting regulations resulted in more extensive 
levels of RRD and in an improved quality (Woods et al., 2008; Oliveira et al., 2011; 
Greco, 2012), even after the turmoil caused by the global financial crisis (Ntim et al., 
2013).  
 Another stream of risk reporting research focuses on examining the determinants 
of RRD. On this regard, recent studies have analysed the potential connections between 
corporate governance mechanisms and RRD, because different corporate governance 
models may induce different RRD incentives (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Taylor et al., 
2010; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013; 
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Ntim et al., 2013). However, prior literature has been focused on Anglo-Saxon 
countries, where the ‘shareholder’ governance model is quite common (Taylor et al., 
2010; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). Under 
the ‘shareholder’ governance model financial reporting model is oriented towards full 
disclosure, transparency, investor protection rights, and “shareholders alone elect 
members of the governing board, payouts are less closely linked to current-period 
accounting income, and public disclosure is a more likely solution for the information 
asymmetry problem (Ball et al., 2000, p. 3). In contrast, Code Law countries are 
characterized by a ‘stakeholder’ governance model, oriented toward legal compliance. 
Opaque with low disclosure, financial reporting is aimed at creditor protection, and 
offers weaker investor protection (Meek and Thomas, 2004; García-Castro et al., 2008). 
Consequently, motivations for risk reporting in Code Law countries may be different. 
Thus, our first research question is: What are the risk reporting practices across 
companies belonging to European Latin Code Law countries? 
Moreover, Mokhatar and Mellet (2013, p. 842) argue that “our understanding to 
these [corporate governance] determinants is still limited” and there is still limited 
research on corporate RRD (Dobler et al., 2011; Abraham and Shrives, 2014). But in a 
recent study, Abraham and Shrives (2014, p. 93) used institutional theoretical 
arguments to conclude that managers can use risk disclosures to manage organizational 
legitimacy (strategic and institutional). Risk reporting can be symbolic, rather than 
substantive, and therefore a pure exercise of reputation risk management. Mimicking 
RRD from companies with good reputation and using standardized disclosures over 
time imply generic RRD decoupled of any useful information to investors. Sarens and 
D’Onza (2017) conclusions highlight that this reporting behavior can jeopardize 
companies’ health in the long-term. They concluded that financial analysts pay greater 
attention to detailed, customized, future-oriented individual risks, rather than generic 
information on risk management and internal control systems, which is less transparent, 
less relevant, and from a lower quality. On the other hand, prior literature on RRD has 
indicated that some corporate governance mechanisms are crucial to improve the quality 
of risk disclosures (Taylor et al., 2010; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013; Agyei-Mensah, 2017; 
Singh, 2017; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Allini et al., 2016; 
Madrigal et al., 2015; Carmona et al., 2016). Consequently, our second research 
question is: since Code Law countries are characterized by a “stakeholder” governance 
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model, in which way the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on RRD is 
mediated by strategic/institutional legitimacy interests? 
The present study assesses the risk reporting practices and how firm’s and 
corporate governance characteristics explain RRD motivations across two European 
Latin Code Law countries (Portugal and Spain) in 2011. The present research setting is 
interesting for the following reason: as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis that 
afflicted European countries, Portugal and Spain required a bailout in May 2011 and 
June 2012, respectively. This adverse economic environment affected severely 
company’s liquidity risk. Prior research found that higher levels of liquidity risk were 
positively associated with risk information (Elshandidy et al., 2015) and RRD were 
influenced by the global financial crisis (Elshandidy and Nery, 2015; Gulko et al., 
2017). However, Ntim et al. (2013) studied RRD in the pre- and post-2007-2008 global 
financial crisis periods and did not found any significant variations. Following this vein, 
Linsley (2011) call for a greater reflection on the relationship between RRD and the 
recent global financial crisis. Consequently, the present study contributes to the 
literature shedding crucial empirical insights on RRD and its relationship with corporate 
governance mechanism during a period of crisis (the European sovereign debt crisis), 
boosted by the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (Lane, 2012). 
Moreover, most studies on RRD and corporate governance mechanisms used 
theoretical frameworks drawn on agency theory (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Taylor et al., 2010; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013) an 
on multi-theoretical frameworks grounded on agency theory, legitimacy theory and 
resources-based perspectives (Oliveira et al., 2011). Oliveira et al. (2011) focused they 
study in years before the recent global financial crisis and concluded that Portuguese 
non-finance companies used RRD to manage reputation and litigation costs. However, 
in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, we can find opposing incentives to 
RRD. From a regulatory prespective, to contain contagion effects, regulatory entities 
took measures to improve corporate governance mechanisms and consequently RRD 
(OECD, 2009). On the other hand, from a managerial perspective, due to financial 
distress and negative organizational outcomes, managers felt a greater need to manage 
corporate image and reputation through RRD (Abraham and Shrives, 2014).  
Drawn on elements of agency, legitimacy, resources-based perspectives, and 
institutional theory this study predicts that in periods of crisis the influence of corporate 
governance mechanism on RRD is mediated by strategic/institutional legitimacy 
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interests. A theoretical argument and a research setting such as this one has never been 
studied hitherto in risk reporting literature and it will allow us to obtain insightful 
knowledge able to answer the calls of prior research regarding the extant gaps in risk 
reporting literature, bringing several contributions to literature: a) studying risk 
reporting in countries with weak risk reporting legislation (Dobler et al., 2011); b) 
examining the impact of a wider set of corporate governance mechanisms on RRD 
(Mokhtar and Mellet, 2013); c) adopting a “conceptual wider lenses” to obtain holistic 
insights on the motivations to risk reporting (Abraham and Shrives, 2014); d) and, 
finally assessing if the theoretical framework developed by Oliveira et al. (2011), even 
during a period of significant financial/economic distress, remains suitable in explaining 
risk reporting motivations in European Southern countries. 
Main findings reveal that some institutional factors impacted on RRD patterns, 
such as the legal environment. Moreover, findings reveal that in periods of financial 
distress visible companies operating in a country with weaker legal environment 
disclose more RRD to manage their strategic legitimacy and reputation by spending 
more time in the contextualization of their negative outcomes. Some corporate 
governance mechanisms (such as board independence, board meeting, and unitary board 
leadership structures) were crucial to improve RRD in such away. Consequently, in the 
present research setting – European Latin countries characterized by a “stakeholder” 
corporate governance model, with low agency costs, and suffering from financial 
distress due to a deep sovereign debt crisis – results support explanations of RRD to a 
combination of agency theory, legitimacy theory, resources-based perspectives, and 
institutional theory. Not only corporate governance mechanisms are relevant to improve 
RRD, but also some institutional aspects (economic environment) and managers’ 
strategic legitimacy interests. From a theoretical point of view, these findings indicate 
that risk reporting continues to be a fertile research field. If strategic legitimacy interests 
are relevant, then it is crucial the analysis of the influence of managers’ personal 
characteristics in process of building their mental models to inform on risk. The study of 
the influence of managers’ idiosyncrasies on disclosure has implications in the 
corporate governance agenda associated with board composition issues. 
From a practitioner point of view, the disclosure patterns found (such as 
qualitative, backward-looking, and bad news) continue to impair the usefulness of RRD 
to stakeholders. To safeguard the interests of stakeholders and improve risk reporting 
quality we believe that national and international regulators should include in their 
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agenda the development of a RRD disclosure framework, perhaps aligned with the 
International Integrated Reporting guidelines (Ntim et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2013). 
In the next section we present the literature review, the theoretical framework, 
and hypotheses. Thereafter, we describe the research method, report results and finalize 
with conclusions. 
 
Literature review and hypothesis development 
Prior literature on the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and RRD are 
focused on Anglo-Saxon countries (Taylor et al., 2010; Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013), developing Islamic/African countries 
(Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013; Agyei-Mensah, 2017), India (Singh, 2017) and European 
Latin countries (Oliveira et al., 2011; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Allini et al., 2016; 
Madrigal et al., 2015; Carmona et al., 2016), using different explanatory variables to 
assess different aspects of the same constructs (such as board composition, ownership 
structure, and audit committee). Table 1 presents the mains findings of this literature. 
(insert table 1 here) 
Among European Latin countries, prior studies have explored the connection 
between internal corporate governance mechanisms and RRD in Portugal (Oliveira et 
al., 2011), Italy (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Allini et al., 2016) and Spain (Madrigal et 
al., 2015; Carmona et al., 2016). Elshandidy and Neri (2015) found that corporate 
governance does not stimulates Italian firms to disclose RRD voluntarily. But firm 
incentives (such as higher level of liquidity risk) do. Corporate governance only 
stimulates the compliance with risk regulations. Allini et al. (2016) found that only 
board diversity (assessed by board gender, educational background, and age) stimulates 
RRD among state-owned enterprises. Carmona et al. (2016) found that the board of 
directors independence, level of activity of the board, gender diversity, CEO duality, 
audit committee independence, type of external auditor, and the presence of institutional 
investors are associated with high RRD in the Combined Governance annual reports. 
However, these prior researches only assessed: a) the connections between the 
internal mechanisms (scattered heterogeneously throughout the literature) of corporate 
governance and RRD; b) findings from Allini’s et al. (2016) study only applies to listed 
state-owned enterprises; c) and Carmona’s et al. (2016) findings result from an 
exploratory analysis of the combinatory effects among multiple corporate governance 
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practices on risk disclosure, through the use of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis.  
The present study addresses these research gaps by extending prior literature in 
four ways. First, by exploring the association between a wider and homogeneous range 
of internal corporate governance mechanisms and RRD in an under-researched setting 
(European Latin countries such as Portugal and Spain).  Second, as responses to Ntim´s 
et al. (2013) call it analyses the connection between external mechanisms of corporate 
governance (such as the strength of legal enforcement mechanisms) on RRD, never 
studied hitherto. Third, it extends Carmona et al. (2016) work by using an effects-of-
causes approach (traditional regression) instead of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis. Finally, European Latin countries, due to IAS/IFRS adoption follow a code-
law institutional logic regarding financial reporting (Guerreiro et al., 2012), but they 
have a ‘stakeholder” governance model (García-Castro et al., 2008). Companies are 
characterized by low levels of agency costs and in 2011 Portugal and Spain were under 
a special scrutiny of the European Union, The International Monetary Fund, and 
international rating agencies due to their deep sovereign debt crisis. Thus, motivations 
for RRD may be different from those found in prior literature.  
Prior research indicates that in periods of crisis managers have incentives to use 
disclosures to manage corporate image and reputation (Abraham and Shrives, 2014). On 
the other hand, since the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, regulatory entities 
recommended better RRD through the improvement of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Magnan and Markarian, 2011). Consequently, based on a multi-theoretical 
framework grounded on agency theory, legitimacy theory, resources-based perspectives 
and institutional theory the present study tries to conciliate these opposing disclosure 
incentives and predicts that in periods of a crisis the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on RRD are mediated by strategic/institutional legitimacy interests. 
 
Agency theory 
To solve agency problems the literature has identified several internal governance 
mechanisms (ownership structure, board characteristics, management compensation, 
and debt/dividend policy) and external governance mechanisms (takeover threat, 
product-market competition, managerial labour market and mutual monitoring by 
managers, security analysts, the legal environment, and the role of reputation) has been 
identified by the literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
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Ownership Structure 
Diffused ownership structures have higher agency costs (Eng and Mack, 2003). 
Therefore, greater levels of disclosure are expected because owners have difficulties in 
monitoring managers’ behaviours. On the other hand, in more concentrated ownership 
structures larger shareholders have a relevant participation in management and therefore 
lower levels of disclosures are expected (Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013). However, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) indicate that in case of convergence of interest between the largest 
shareholder and outside investors can imply a positive relationship. In terms of 
corporate governance system Portuguese institutions are quite similar to Spanish 
institutions (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). Listed companies are basically family-owned. 
In both countries banks dominate as source of financing and they have a crucial role in 
corporate governance regarding the composition/roles of the board members (Pérez et 
al., 2015).  
Previous literature on risk reporting provides inconclusive results. Abraham and 
Cox (2007), Ntim et al. (2013) and Singh (2017) found positive and negative 
associations. Taylor et al. (2010), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Oliveira et al. (2011), 
and Agyei-Mensah (2017) did not find any association at all. 
H1: Concentrated ownership structure is associated positively with RRD. 
 
Board size 
Prior literature indicates that larger boards have greater diversity (expertise, experience, 
knowledge, and stakeholder representation), which may increase risk management 
activities and affect voluntary disclosure choices (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2013). On the other hand, agency theory states that larger boards may lead to less 
coordination, communication and monitoring, affecting negatively corporate 
performance and disclosure (Jensen, 1993). In Spain the Code of Good Governance 
recommends a board size of 5-15 members to be effective. But Portugal does not 
specify the number of directors that the board should have. Only indicates that an 
excessive board size can jeopardize board’s cohesion, effectiveness and decision-
making process. Prior risk reporting literature found a positive association between risk 
reporting and board size (Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Elshandidy and 
Neri, 2015; Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Singh, 2017). However, Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012) and Allini et al. (2016) did not find any significant association.  
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H2: Board size is associated with RRD. 
 
Board independence 
Independent non-executive directors are crucial elements in reducing agency costs, 
turning the board more effective in their daily activities and affecting positively the 
quality and quantity of financial reporting – which includes RRD (Buckby et al., 2015).  
In Spain, the Code of Good Governance recommends that the number of non-
executive independent directors should be at least half the size of the board of directors 
(Recommendation 17). In Portugal, it is only recommended that the board of directors 
should include a number of non-executive independent members to assure the 
supervision and assessment of non-executive directors’ activities. 
 Risk reporting literature has not been conclusive on the relationship between 
RRD and independent non-executive directors. Some studies have found a positive 
association (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Agyei-Mensah, 2017), but 
others did not find any significant association (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Buckby et 
al., 2015; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Allini et al., 2016; Singh, 2017). In the 
Portuguese context, Oliveira et al. (2011) found a positive association. In the Spanish 
setting, findings have not been conclusive (Madrigal et al., 2015; Carmona et al., 2016). 
However, following the theoretical framework of agency theory we propose: 
H3: Board independence is associated positively with RRD 
 
Board diversity 
Board diversity is desirable for several reasons: a) improves debate and the exchange of 
ideas; b) helps assuring the representativeness of all corporation stakeholders; c) 
promotes more effective global relationships; d) and increases board independence 
(Kang et al., 2007). In Spain, corporate governance regulation deals board diversity in 
terms of gender. Recommendation n.º 14 states for Boards Appointments to implement 
mechanisms to promote the selection of women and recommends a quota of 30% of 
women by 2020 in the boards of listed companies. In Portugal a government resolution 
of 2015 encourages listed companies to attain 30% of underrepresented sex at their 
boards by 2018. In 2012, the European Commission proposed a Directive to accelerate 
gender balance on corporate boards, setting a quantitative objective of a 40% presence 
of underrepresented sex among non-executive directors of listed companies. From a 
psychological point of view, studies have shown that gender is strongly correlated with 
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risk judgments, risk assessment, risk perception, affective reactions and disclosure 
choices (Slovic et al., 1997). Prior literature found a positive association between board 
diversity and voluntary disclosure (Barako and Brown, 2008) and risk reporting (Ntim 
et al., 2013; Allini et al., 2016; Singh, 2017). 
H4: Board diversity is associated positively with RRD 
 
Board and audit committee meetings 
Corporate governance recommendations in Spain and Portugal state that the board of 
directors should meet regularly. Board and committees’ meetings are crucial aspects to 
assure boards effectiveness, improve firm’s value, reduce agency costs, and 
complements auditor oversight (Laksmana, 2008). Active boards and committees that 
meet regularly have more time to discuss, confer, and monitor management actions. 
This enforces the monitoring of financial reporting (Allini et al., 2016), its quality, 
reduces the risk of fraud, and improves de quality of auditing procedures (Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013). Prior literature found that board/committees’ meetings and disclosure are 
positively associated (Laksmana, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). However, among 
RRD literature any association was found (Allini et al., 2016; Singh, 2017). 
H5a: Board meetings are associated positively with RRD 
H5b: Audit committee meetings are associated positively with RRD 
 
Dual board leadership 
Dual board leadership occurs when the roles of the CEO and Chairman are performed 
by different individuals. In contrast, role duality exists if the CEO and the chairman 
positions are held by the same individual. Because of their dominance over the board, 
agency theory indicates that unitary leadership structures can deteriorate board’s 
functions (Barako et al., 2006), and therefore disclosure choices, such as RRD (Lim et 
al., 2007). By contrast, other authors consider that unitary leadership structures leads to 
better corporate outcomes associated with CEO’s clearer focus on firm goal, 
opportunities, and long-term welfare of the company, quick management decision-
making process, clear unambiguous leadership, and improved managerial accountability 
(Khan et al., 2013). 
 On the other hand, agency theory posits that decision management and decision 
control processes needed to be separate. This would improve board’s monitoring, 
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managers discipline, board accountability, independence, and RRD reporting (Ntim et 
al., 2013).  
Spain and Portugal accept both types of leadership structures. Prior research on 
risk reporting did not find any association between RRD and dual board leadership 
(Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Singh, 
2017).  
H6: Dual board leadership is associated positively with RRD 
 
Management compensation 
Theoretically, investors use earnings and management compensation information to 
assess management efforts in increasing future returns (Martikainen et al., 2015). 
Management compensation can be divided into two parts: a fixed and variable one. The 
variable part has a short-term component (based on company’s success such EBIT or 
profit) and a long-term component that contains a stock-option plan (Siggelkow and 
Zülch, 2013).  
Based on the efficient labour market hypothesis, Martikainen et al. (2015) 
suggest two conflicting visions. If labour market is efficient it is expected that higher 
management compensation is positively associated with managers’ motivation to 
increase the value of the firm and to improve corporate risk disclosures. On the other 
hand, if labour market is inefficient, highly compensated managers may think that they 
do not have to prove their professional skills in the market and therefore a negative 
association is expected. 
Additionally, some studies found that stock options performance incentives have 
no significant association with agency costs reduction arguments (Yermack, 1996). This 
could be due to countries institutional environment – their legal and political 
characteristics (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) – or to managers’ self-serving behaviour 
associated with the announcement of good/bad news (Yermack, 1996). 
H7: Management compensation is associated with RRD 
 
Audit committee independence 
Spanish and Portuguese Codes of Corporate Governance state that audit committees 
should report information to shareholders, assess internal control and risk management 
systems effectiveness, perform internal auditing, and supervise the preparation and 
presentation of forward-looking financial information. Thus, audit committees are 
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commonly seen as monitoring mechanisms (Barako et al., 2006) able to mitigate agency 
costs and information asymmetries (Al-Najar and Abed, 2014) and improve financial 
reporting quality. Spanish and Portuguese Codes of Corporate Governance recommend 
that audit committee members are expected to be independent, basically because 
independent audit committees are more sensitive to RRD as a way to mitigate agency 
costs. 
 Some studies on risk reporting did not find any association between RRD and 
audit committees size and independence (Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 
2012; Buckby et al., 2015). However, Carmona et al. (2016) found that the audit 
committee independence of Spanish companies is positively associated with RRD. 
H8: Audit committee independence is associated positively with RRD. 
 
Leverage 
According to Hart (1995) debt policy can act as a monitoring/disciplining mechanism of 
managers’ behaviour. If a company has debts managers have fewer incentives to take 
discretionary actions, because they have fewer cash-flows. Moreover, leveraged 
companies are riskier and to reduce information asymmetries debtholders will 
encourage management to disclose more information (Lisnley and Shrives, 2006). On 
the other hand, Linsley and Shrives (2006) state that leveraged companies with higher 
levels of risk may try to divert attention to these risks and smooth the disclosure of risk 
information, or as proposed by Leuz et al. (2004) information on risk was captured in 
other corporate documents beyond annual reports. This is crucial among Spanish and 
Portuguese companies in which banks dominate as source of financing and share the 
role of management with other shareholders/managers (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; 
Pérez et al., 2015). 
 Prior research on RRD have shown mixed findings: positive associations (Taylor 
et al., 2010; Oliveira et al., 2011; Buckby et al., 2015), negative associations (Ntim et 
al., 2013), and any association at all (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Allini et al., 2016). 
H9: Leverage is associated with RRD. 
 
Legal environment  
The legal environment (through legislation) as an external mechanism of corporate 
governance can directly affect the efficiency of some monitoring devices such the 
protection of minority shareholders and legal structures of corporate governance 
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(LaPorta et al., 1997). However, is not just the presence of regulation that matters, but 
also the capacity to monitor firms behaviour and enforce these regulations. Leuz et al. 
(2003) argues that legal systems can protect outside investors in two different ways: 
gives them the right to discipline insiders and the ability to design contracts to limit the 
private information. Consequently, legal environment can reduce the incentives for 
insiders act in irresponsible ways (e.g. manipulation/obfuscation of earnings or risk 
information to conceal their self-serving behaviour) (Chih et al., 2010). 
H10: Legal environment is associated positively with RRD 
 
Legitimacy theory and resource dependency theory 
Strategic legitimacy sees legitimacy as an operational resource that needs to be gained, 
maintained or restored (Suchman, 1995). On this regard, resource dependency theory 
establishes that organizations are interest-driven and attempt to obtain legitimacy by 
using active choice behaviours to manipulate external dependencies (the relevant 
stakeholders who provide crucial resources to organizations) and exert influence over 
the allocation or source of critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Public visible 
organizations confront greater demands from a variety of relevant external actors. But, 
they are also more able to exert some degree of influence, control or power over the 
resource environment. To enhance corporate reputation they seek stability and 
legitimacy by strategically controlling the legitimation process through disclosure to 
influence external dependencies’ perceptions of themselves and control resources flow 
(Oliver, 1991). 
H11: Public visibility is associated positively with RRD. 
 
Legitimacy theory and institutional theory 
Institutional legitimacy sees legitimacy as a set of constitutive beliefs. On this 
perspective, power tends to be attributed to the institutional environment. Through 
processes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), these institutional 
constituents exert power, force, pressure, control and expectations on organizations to 
adopt specific internal procedures and practices (coercive isomorphism). To survive and 
achieve stability and organizational legitimacy, organizations need to conform and 
adhere to these external rules and norms through the reproduction or imitation of 
organizational structures, activities, and routines (mimetic isomorphism).  
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Thus, the Portuguese and Spanish Securities Exchange Commissions demand that listed 
companies must publish the Corporate Governance Annual Report. This report follows 
a “comply or explain” rationale, but it is coercively demanded by law. However, 
because risk disclosures recommended are vague, to achieve organizational legitimacy – 
the acceptance by its environment – managers have incentives to mimic the risk 
disclosures from those companies with a good reputation. Manager’s mimetic behaviour 
will signal that their corporate governance structure or procedures (such as risk 
management systems) are legitimate. However, according to Abraham and Shrives 
(2014) this behaviour can be purely symbolic, rather than substantive. Since disclosures 
are industry-wide, non-specific, and routinely standardise they will be unhelpful to 
readers. Consequently, risk reporting procedures besides legitimated they can be 
decoupled from the substantive structures of risk management, which are consequently 
illegitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To control decoupling strategies, the Portuguese 
and Spanish Securities Exchange Commissions endorses the organizations’ means and 
ends as valid, reasonable, and rational, by assessing the corporate governance 
recommendations compliance level of listed companies. Assessment results are 
published annually, are accessible to all stakeholders, demonstrate the present corporate 
governance robustness level per company, and consequently these institutions 
legitimate the corporate governance structures of organizations. This procedure is 
consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) argument that corporate governance structures are 
an important determinant of a company’s transparency policy and a mechanism to 
improve the quality of financial reporting. Additionally, Taylor et al. (2010) suggest 
firms with an effective corporate governance structure in place are expected to disclose 
more information, because they are more accountable and transparent. 
H13: Corporate governance robustness is associated positively with RRD. 
  
Control variables 
Consistently with previous literature we considered the following control variables: 
profitability, company risk, and external auditor quality (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Oliveira et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Buckby et al., 2015; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
 
Research method 
Sample 
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Consolidated annual reports and corporate governance reports for 2011 of 60 non-
finance Portuguese and Spanish companies listed on the regulated market Euronext 
Lisbon and on the Spanish Stock Exchange regulated market, respectively, as at 31 
December 2011 were analysed. 
 In the Spanish subsample we first considered all companies included in the 
IBEX-35 drawn up by Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (BME). The index IBEX-35 is a 
“capitalization-weighted stock market index, comprised of the 35 most liquid Spanish 
stocks traded in the continuous market, and is the benchmark index for the Madrid 
Stock Exchange.” (Fernández and Arana, 2010, p. 119). Finance companies were 
excluded, because they differ from non-finance companies in terms of business model 
and disclosure requirements (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). This gave us a final 
subsample of 30 Spanish companies.  
In the Portuguese subsample we first considered all companies included in 
the PSI-20. The PSI-20 is a benchmark stock market index of companies traded on 
Euronext Lisbon stock exchange market. In 2011, there were 44 companies with 
stocks traded on the Euronext Lisbon stock exchange market, in which the twenty 
largest companies (assessed by the largest market capitalization and share 
turnover) were included in the PSI-20 stock market index. Following Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) we removed four finance companies, which gave us a sample of 16 
non-finance companies. To increase sample representativeness we added the 
largest 14 non-companies (assessed by market capitalization) with stocks traded on 
Euronext Lisbon stock exchange market, but that did not belong to PSI-20. This 
allowed us to have a final subsample of 30 Portuguese non-finance companies  
The final sample comprises the most representative non-finance companies 
from Spain and Portugal. Prior literature indicate that companies included in 
IBEX-35 are the most significant and represent 30 percent of all publicly traded 
companies and more than 95 per cent of the total capitalization of the Spanish 
stock market (Sierra et al., 2013; Capriotti and Moreno, 2007a, 2007b). The 
indexes IBEX-35 and PSI-20 are representative of the various sectors that 
constitute the Spanish and Portuguese market, respectively (Capriotti and Moreno, 
2007b; Caiado, 2004). The PSI-20 stock market index is one of the main national 
indexes of the Pan-European stock exchange group Euronext alongside with 
Brussels’ BEL20, Paris’s CAC40, and Amsterdam’s AEX. The “reduced size of 
the Portuguese finance market suggest that the behaviour of the national stock 
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returns is closer to the behaviour of stock returns in European and American 
markets (Caiado, 2004). Finally, the total assets of the thirty non-finance listed 
companies included in the Portuguese subsample represent 98,6% of the total 
assets of all companies with stocks traded, in 2011, on the Euronext Lisbon stock 
exchange market (after the exclusion of all finance companies). Consequently, the 
sample is representative, results are generalizable, and therefore this sample allows 
us to achieving our research objectives.  
 
Dependent variable 
Based on previous works of Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007), 
Dobler et al. (2011), and Ntim et al. (2013) we used content analysis to quantify RRD 
included in the “risk and risk management” sections of management reports and in the 
corporate governance reports for 2011of the sampled companies. 
Prior research has used different concepts of risk: RRD narratives (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Martikainen 
et al., 2015; Alini et al., 2016), voluntary/mandatory financial risk management 
disclosures (Taylor et al., 2010), mandatory financial risk (Agyei-Mensah, 2017), risk 
management disclosures (Buckby et al., 2015), risk keywords (Singh, 2017), and 
voluntary/mandatory RRD including narratives, tables and graphs (Oliveira et al., 
2011; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). The present study adopts a broad 
concept of risk encapsulating “any opportunity or prospect, or any hazard, danger, 
threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon 
the company in the future or the management of any such opportunity, prospect, 
hazard, threat or exposure” (Lisnley and Shrives, 2006). This concept embraces any 
risk exposure, activities/policies to manage/mitigate those exposures, and any 
description and evaluation of internal control/risk management systems effectiveness.  
According to Ntim et al. (2013) we developed two categories of risk: financial 
risk (FR) and non-financial risk (NFR). The concept of FR embraces any exposure to 
interest risk, exchange rate risk, commodity risk, liquidity risk, and credit risk. The 
concept of NFR incorporates five subcategories in line with Linsley and Shrives 
(2006): operational risk, empowerment risk, information and technology risk, integrity 
risk and strategic risk. 
Four semantic properties of the information disclosed were used (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Dobler et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013): a) 
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impact (positive/negative/normal); b) time horizon (past/future/neutral); c) 
quantification (monetary/non-monetary); d) and location (management report/corporate 
governance report). 
Content analysis has been applied in disclosure research works and we used 
sentences as the recording unit, because it is expected to yield more accurate data and 
has been used widely (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Dobler et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 
2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013). Since content 
analysis is inherently subjective some procedures are needed to assure reliability 
(Linsley and Shrives 2006). Thus, a list of disambiguation rules has been set out 
based on the work of Linsley and Shrives (2006). Narratives, tables and graphs 
were codified. Scott’s pi measure of inter-coder reliability (Scott’s pi = 0.81) was used 
to assess the reliability of the content analysis.  
A score of RRD for the j
th
 company in the n
th
 country was calculated as follows: 
RRDjn =             +        
  
    
where 
FRijn = number of FR sentences for the sentence attribute i in the j
th
 company of the n
th
 
country. 
NFRijn = number of NFR sentences for the sentence attribute i in the j
th
 company of 
the n
th
 country. 
sa = number of sentence attributes (sa = 36) 
 
Estimation model 
The regression model used tries to analyse the relationship between RRD, corporate 
governance mechanisms associated with agency theory (AT), legitimacy/resources 
dependency/institutional factors (LRDI), and control variables: 
RRDi = α0 +    
  
    ATi +     
 
   LRDIi +     
 
   CONTROLSi  + i 
 
Table 2 describes each independent and control variables, regarding definition, 
measurement, data source, and expected sign. 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
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Table 3 indicates 3,805 sentences containing RRD. The risk category disclosed more 
often is FR (All sample=38.8%; Portugal=36%; Spain=41.4%) followed by integrity 
risk (All sample=24.1%; Portugal=28.5%; Spain=19.9%), strategic risk (All 
sample=19.3%; Portugal=18.5%; Spain=20.1%), and operational risk (All 
sample=15.4%; Portugal=13.8%; Spain=17%). This is consistent with Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) findings. Mann-Whitney U tests also indicate that risk disclosures from 
Portuguese and Spanish companies are not significantly different (p-value > 0.05). 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 Table 4 (top band of panel A) indicates that the total number of sentences with 
negative impact (bad news) (Portugal=357; Spain=496) is significantly greater (p-
value<0.01) than those with positive impact (good news) (Portugal=98; Spain=89). 
These results are not consistent with prior research (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Oliveira et al., 2011; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013). 
(insert Table 4 about here) 
 
 Results from Table 4 (middle band of Panel A) also indicate that backward-
looking RRD (Portugal=788; Spain=1,106) are significantly greater (p-value<0.01) 
than forward-looking RRD (Portugal=236; Spain=149). This finding is consistent with 
prior research (Dobler et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013).  
 Finally, Table 4 (third band of Panel A) documents that non-monetary RRD 
(Portugal=1,769; Spain=1,799) are significantly greater (p-value<0.01) than monetary 
RRD (Portugal=78; Spain=159), and consistent with prior research (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Dobler et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011; Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013).  
 These results indicate a particular disclosure pattern that potentially is related to 
the research setting used in the present study. In Portuguese and Spanish economies 
were suffering from a deep sovereign debt crisis. These economic imbalances affected 
negatively companies’ liquidity, increased their financial distress, their business and 
financial risks, and decreased organizational outcomes (Lane, 2012). The most 
interesting is that table 5 presents low levels of leverage (Portugal=0.45; Spain=0.34). 
In fact, according to Reverte (2009) and Oliveira et al., (2011) in 2005 leverage was 
substantially higher (Portugal=1.03; Spain=3.804). 
(insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 6 presents the evolution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and shows the 
economic and financial distress since 2007/2008 financial crisis (World Bank, 2014). 
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Moreover, it shows that Portugal and Spain suffered an economic recession in 2011 
and 2012, respectively. Exactly in the same years they required a bailout to the 
European Union and International Monetary Fund. 
(insert table 6 here) 
After the recent global financial crisis the Eurozone countries expanded public 
debt issuance, which was absorbed by domestic banking industry. According to 
Eurostat between 2010 and 2013, sovereign debt holdings of domestic banks increased 
by 5% of GDP, but between 2007 and 2012, government debt held by the domestic 
financial sector increased by 13% of GDP. These variations were around 30% in 
countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. As a result, corporate 
credit loans contracted, the cost of debt increased, and only the few companies used the 
bond market to raise capital. Moreover, some banks were using funding from the 
European Central Bank to buy sovereign debt. However, The European Central Bank 
set collateral haircuts based on countries credit rating (Becker and Ivashina, 2014). 
During this process several banks went bankrupted, others were recapitalized and after 
several downgrades from international credit rating agencies, Portugal and Spain 
required a bailout in May 2011 and June 2012, respectively. This has created a deeper 
economic and financial distress among the banking sector with greater implication on 
company’s liquidity risk due to the contraction of corporate credit loans. In Code Law 
countries (such as Portugal and Spain) money flows through financial institutions and 
financing policies are bank-oriented (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007), which justifies the 
low levels of leverage presented in table 5. 
 In an economic context like this one, managers opted not to adopt self-serving 
disclosure behaviours. Instead of obfuscating bad news, they used a strategy of 
retrospective sense-making (Aerts, 2005). They disclosed more bad news than good 
news. In periods of financial distress negative organizational outcomes are more salient 
to relevant stakeholders and expose management to their scrutiny. Therefore, 
disclosure pattern found may be related to an informational process (Aerts, 2005). 
Management needs to present more accounting explanations to contextualize these 
negative outcomes and legitimate themselves with stakeholders. In this effort of 
contextualization of organizational outcomes managers were reluctant to release 
forward-looking information to avoid the threat of external effects (Dobler, 2008), and 
disclosed more qualitative RRD to contextualize negative organizational outcomes and 
therefore to promoting legitimacy (Aerts, 2005). 
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 Table 5 (Panel A) reports that on average each company disclose 63.42 
sentences of RRD (mean value in Portugal=61.57; mean value in Spain=65.27). 
Portuguese companies disclose more in Corporate Governance reports, while Spanish 
companies in the Management report. In terms of board size (Portugal=10.67; 
Spain=13.13), the proportion of independent non-executive directors (Portugal=0.21; 
Spain=0.41), board diversity (Portugal=0.09; Spain=0.13), board and audit committee 
meetings (Portugal=16.66; Spain=17.87), and audit committee independence 
(Portugal=0.43; Spain =0.55) Portugal present lower levels compared to Spain. 
Generally, companies comply with almost corporate governance recommendations in 
both countries (mean value in Portugal=0.90; mean value in Spain=0.89). Portuguese 
and Spanish companies present different ownership structure concentration (mean 
value in Portugal=0.76; mean value in Spain=0.35). Around 50% of Portuguese and 
33% of Spanish sample firms have a dual board leadership.  
  
Regression Analysis 
Table 7 presents the correlation matrix. The value of the correlation coefficients 
indicates that multicollinearity is minimal. 
(insert Table 7 about here) 
Table 8 presents the regression analysis. We used ordinary least squares (OLS) 
to test our hypotheses. The stability of the regression model was assured by assessing 
all the assumptions such as autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heterocedasticity, outliers 
and influential observations, and normality of residuals. 
(insert Table 8 here) 
 Table 8 results indicate that collinearity issues are minimal (Variance Inflation 
Factors ≤ 4.274). We also have run White’s heterocedasticity test to test for unequal 
variances, and when necessary, heterocedastivity was corrected by the White matrix. 
Finally, the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that autocorrelation is minimal. 
 Findings indicate that the regression model is statistically significant (F-
statistic=5.1; p-value<0.01) for RRD. The regression model presents an explanatory 
power (adjusted R
2
) of 0.554.  
 RRD is associated positively with ownership structure (p-value<0.01), 
independent non-executive directors (p-value<0.01), and size (p-value<0.01). 
Hypotheses H1 (ownership structure), H3 (independent non-executive directors), and 
H11 (public visibility) are supported. This result is consistent with prior research 
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(Taylor et al., 2010; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2013). According to legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective public visible 
companies disclose more RRD to manage relevant stakeholders’ expectations on 
corporate image and reputation and achieve strategic legitimacy.  
 Consistent with Oliveira et al., (2011) and Ntim et al., (2013) companies with 
more independent boards of directors disclose more RRD probably to reduce agency 
costs. Findings also indicate that companies with a higher ownership concentration 
disclose more RRD. Descriptive analysis shows that ownership structure of Portuguese 
companies are more concentrated than Spanish companies. Portuguese companies are 
commonly controlled by families, which are frequently the largest shareholder (Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007). According to agency theory, among family controlled 
companies the assumption of convergence of interests between the largest shareholder 
and outside investors may become salient, mainly in periods of financial distress 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In these cases it is expected a positive relationship 
between ownership structure and RRD. 
Results from Table 8 also documents that RRD is associated negatively with 
audit committee independence (p-value<0.05) and legal environment (p-value<0.01). 
Hypothesis H8 and H10 are not supported. Less independent audit committees disclose 
more RRD. Moreover, companies belonging to countries with weaker legal 
environments disclose more RRD. Descriptive analysis (table 5) indicates that 
Portuguese companies have less independent audit committees and a weaker legal 
environment compared to Spain. Besides, due to the sovereign debt crisis Portugal 
required a bailout in May 2011, one year before Spain. Prior research found that 
companies with higher levels of liquidity risk disclose more risk information 
(Elshandidy et al., 2015). Consequently, these results may indicate a behaviour 
consistent with Aerts (2005) arguments that considers this reporting pattern related to 
an informational process of contextualization of the negative outcomes. Acting this 
way they try to manage their strategic legitimacy, rather than reducing agency costs.
 Hypotheses H2 (board size), H4 (board diversity), H5a (board meetings), H5b 
(audit committee meetings), H6 (dual board leadership), H7 (management 
compensation), H9 (leverage), and H11 (corporate governance robustness) were not 
supported. Results did not indicate any significant association between RRD and these 
variables.  These corporate governance mechanisms and institutional factor (corporate 
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governance robustness) did not impacted on RRD. Instead, public visible companies 
used other mechanisms to foster RRD, such as independent non-executive directors. 
 We reran the regression model for each FR and NFR categories. Most FR were 
disclosed in the “risk and risk management” sections of management reports. 
Regarding financial instruments, both countries require the description of the 
objectives and financial risk management policies followed and exposures to price, 
credit, liquidity, and cash-flow risks. Therefore, this information has a compulsory 
nature. Non-financial risk disclosures were found in the “risk and risk management” 
sections of management reports and corporate governance annual reports. Disclosure 
requirements for non-financial risks in the management reports are very vague. 
Corporate governance recommendations follow the “comply or explain” principle. 
Therefore, managers have discretionary power to manage the content and extension of 
this information and consequently it has a voluntary nature.  
Only the model for NFR was considered statistically significantly. Table 8 
indicates that NFR is positively associated with board independence (p-value < 0.05), 
board meetings (p-value<0.05), and size (p-value<0.01). In larger companies with 
higher public visibility, independent non-executive directors and board meetings 
improve the disclosure of NFR information. Moreover, NFR is negatively associated 
with dual board leadership (p-value<0.05), legal environment (p-value<0.05), and 
environmental sensitivity (p-value<0.01). Companies environmentally sensitive, with 
dual board leadership structures, in countries with stronger legal environments disclose 
less NFR information.  
In 2011, during a particular period of financial distress visible companies 
disclosed more NFR information to manage their legitimacy through the 
contextualization of negative outcomes. Some corporate governance mechanisms were 
significantly important to promote this kind of disclosures, such as the higher 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board, the number of the 
board meetings, and the unitary board leadership structures. 
  
Conclusions 
Our analysis of RRD by Portuguese and Spanish companies supports explanations of 
RRD to a combination of agency, legitimacy theory resources-based perspectives and 
institutional theory. 
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Findings indicate that companies with concentrated ownership structures 
disclose more RRD. But prior literature indicate that in these companies agency costs 
are low (Mokhatar and Mellet, 2013). Pérez et al. (2015) indicate that in these countries 
banks are the main source of financing and it is very common to influence the 
composition of the board. Thus this promotion of RRD seems consistent with the 
argument of reduction of information asymmetries between managers and debtholders. 
However, results indicate that the level of company’s dependency from debtholders 
(assessed by leverage) has decreased (Reverte, 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011), which 
might suggest that other reasons may explain greater RRD. 
Findings also reveal that independent non-executive directors (in the board, not 
in the audit committee) have a relevant role im promoting RRD. From an agency 
theory perspective, they act as monitoring mechanisms to reduce agency costs (Buckby 
et al., 2015). But, this corporate governance mechanism can also be used to manage 
legitimacy, rather than agency costs (Ntim et al., 2013). Independent non-executive 
directors represent corporate stakeholders. Thus, their appointment “can be viewed as 
an attempt to enhance legitimacy by signalling a match between corporate and societal 
values” (Ntim et al., 2013, p. 368). 
Legal environment (assessed by the strength of legal enforcement mechanisms) 
is a crucial element in promoting RRD as an institutional mechanism, rather than an 
external corporate governance tool, as predicted by agency theory. But this does not 
mean that companies acted in irresponsible ways (e.g. concealment of risk 
information). Besides, findings indicate that corporate governance robustness is not a 
significant determinant of RRD, meaning that companies do not disclose RRD to 
pursue institutional legitimacy interest and most probably do not use RRD as 
decoupling strategies (Abraham and Shrives, 2014). 
 In periods of financial distress, public visibility (assessed by size) helps 
enhancing the congruency between corporate goals and stakeholders’ expectations on 
corporate image and reputation achieving strategic legitimacy, because larger firms 
disclose more RRD.  
Consequently, findings suggest that in European Southern countries 
characterized by a “stakeholder” governance model and low levels of agency costs, the 
influence that corporate governance have on RRD is mediated by strategic legitimacy 
interests, rather than institutional legitimacy ones. However, this conclusion is valid 
when companies disclose discretionary risk information (such as NFR), not mandatory 
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risk information (such as FR). Additionally, according to agency theory, independent 
non-executive directors, board meeting, and unitary board leadership structures are 
crucial elements in promoting discretionary risk information. But they are mediated by 
institutional factors (such as the legal environment) and strategic legitimacy interests 
(assessed by public visibility). However, this information continues to be basically 
qualitative, backward-looking, and focused on bad news. Sarens and D’Onza (2017) 
argue that this information may be less transparent, less relevant and with lower 
information quality. On the other hand, Gulko et al. (2017, p. 1) found that during 
periods of crisis companies disclose more risk information and with better quality, 
“while during periods of stability companies generally provide less information and the 
quality of information is generic and repetitive in nature”. Thus, the disclosure pattern 
found in our study is consistent across both countries and aligned with the argument of 
retrospective sense-making – the contextualization of their negative outcomes in order 
to manage their strategic legitimacy (Aerts, 2005). 
The present study adds to the emerging literature on risk reporting and 
corporate governance mechanisms, basically because it broaden our understanding in 
RRD through the analysis of the conditions that motivate managers to disclose risk 
information under specific economic conditions and in countries with specific 
characteristics regarding corporate governance models, legal environments, and level 
of agency costs. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, regulatory entities 
endeavours to contain crisis were basically focused on corporate governance issues. In 
the same vein, prior literature has only assessed the mechanical effects of a company’s 
contextual factors associated with corporate governance issues, through the lens of 
agency theory. Our findings contribute to prior literature by elucidating in a broader 
way that not only corporate governance mechanisms are crucial to improve RRD, but 
other motivations associated with strategic legitimacy interests intertwined with 
economic environmental contexts may mediate their influence. 
If strategic legitimacy is a crucial element in promoting RRD, then our findings 
demonstrate that risk reporting continues to be a fertile research field. Waring (2013) 
refer that risk/risk management behaviour in inherently linked to individual bounded 
rationality. In other words, managers’ idiosyncrasies impact on their strategic decision 
making process, how they report information to third parties, and therefore how they 
behave to pursue strategic legitimacy purposes. Prior literature has forgotten that 
CEO’s personal characteristics may impact on their decisions to inform on risk 
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exposures, and from a regulatory perspective this aspect is also relevant regarding 
corporate governance issues associated with board composition. 
Moreover, our results also highlight some implications for national and 
international regulators. Despite the efforts in improving corporate governance 
mechanisms it seems that the quality and content of risk reporting continues to impair 
its usefulness to stakeholders. Thus, consistent with Ntim et al. (2013) and Oliveira et 
al. (2013) one possible solution to improve the quality of risk reporting could be the 
development of a RRD disclosure framework aligned with the International Integrated 
Reporting guidelines. 
The present study presents some limitations associated with the coding 
instrument, research setting (only two European Latin countries and only one year of 
analysis), and sample size (even knowing that the sample used has representativeness).  
Future studies should incorporate larger samples and other European Latin countries. 
Longitudinal data is also need to provide a better understanding of risk reporting 
incentives and its change over time. Additionally, further studies can also study risk 
reporting incentives from a social psychology perspective, through the use of bounded 
rationality concept and explore in which way CEO’s personal characteristics impact on 
the way they build mental models to report on risk issues. 
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Table 1 – Prior literature on the influence of corporate governance mechanism on RRD 
 
Risk management 
disclosures
Financial risk 
disclosures
Financial risk 
management disclosures
RRD 
keywords
Abraham & 
Cox (2007)
Elzahar & 
Hussainey (2012)
Elshandidy & 
Neri (2015)
Martikainen 
et al. (2015)
Alini et al. 
(2016)
Buckby et al. 
(2015)
Agyei-Mensah 
(2017)
Taylor et al.               
(2010)
Oliveira et al. 
(2011)
Mokhatar and 
Mellet (2013
Ntim et al. 
(2013)
Singh 
(2017)
Board meetings 0 0
Board composition
Executive directors on the board 0
Non-executive directors +
Independent non-executive directors on the board + 0 0 0 0 + + + 0
Board size 0 + 0 + + + +
Board diversity +
   Gender + +
   Educational background - 0
   Age +
Role Duality 0 0 - 0 0
Multiple directorships 0
Equity-based wealth of non-executive directors +
Salary-based compensation of non-executive directors -
High attrition of non-executive directors -
High education of non-executive directors -
Dividend yield -/0
Ownership structure
By life assurance pension funds +
By in-house managed pension funds -
By outside managed pension funds 0
Ownership concentration 0 0 0 - - 0
Institutional ownership 0 0 0 - -
Block ownership 0 +
Foreign owners + -
Shares owned by firm insiders +
Audit committe
Audit coommittee independence 0 0
Audit committee size 0
Educational background 0
Risk committee +
Technology committee +
Corporate governance robusteness +
Leverage 0 0 + 0 + + -
Corporate Governance committee +
Corporate Governance explanatory variables
RRD (narratives, tables and graphs)
Notes: Y: statistically significant; +: positive and statistically significant association; -: negative and statistically significant association; 0: no association found
RRD narratives
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Table 2 – Definition of the independent and control variables 
Variables Measurement
Predicted 
Signal
Source References
Panel A: Independent variables
Agency theory (internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance)
   Ownership structure Qualified shareholdings greater than 2% ?
Annual report
(Taylor et al., 2010; Oliveira et al., 2011; 
Mokhatar & Mellet, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013)
   Board size Number of directors in the board ?
Annual report
(Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2013; Elshandidy & Nery, 2015; Allini et al., 
2016; Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Singh, 2017)
   Board independence Proportion of independent non-executive 
directors in the board
?
Annual report
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Agyei-Mensah, 2017; 
Singh, 2017)
   Board diversity Proportion of women in the board + Annual report form CMVM/CNMV (Allini et al., 2016; Singh, 2017)
Number of board meetings in the year +
Annual report form CMVM/CNMV
Number of audit committee meetings in the year + Annual report form CMVM/CNMV
   Dual board leadership Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO and Chairman 
are different; 0 otherwise
?
Annual report
(Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Mokhatar & 
Mellet, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Singh, 2017)
   Management compensation Dummy variable = 1 if there is a stock options 
plan, 0 otherwise
?
Annual report form CMVM/CNMV (Martikanen et al., 2015)
   Audit committee 
independence
Proporting of independent non-executive 
directors in the audit committee
+
Annual report (Oliveira et al., 2011; Agyei-Mensah, 2017)
   Leverage Debt ratio = Total debt to total assets ?
Annual report
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Taylor et al., 2010; 
Oliveira et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Agyei-
Mensah, 2017)
   Legal environment Strength of legal enforcement mechanisms per country, 
assessed by the average of 4 indicators:
        Rule of law (0-100 best) + The Worldwide Governance indicators (2015)
        Control of corruption (0-100 best) + The Worldwide Governance indicators (2015)
        Judicial independence (0-100 best) + The Global Competitiveness Index Historical 
Dataset (2005-2014)
        Efficiency of legal framework (0-100 best) + The Global Competitiveness Index Historical 
Dataset (2005-2014)
   Board and audit committee 
meetings (Allini et al., 2016; Singh, 2017)
(LaPorta et al., 1998)
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Table 2 – Definition of the independent and control variables (to be continued)[1], [2] 
Variables Measurement
Predicted 
Signal
Source References
Legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective
   Public visibility
         Size Total assets + Annual report
Total sales + Annual report
Market capitalization + Annual report
         Environmental sensitivity Dummy variable = 1 if the company belongs to 
an industry environmentally sensitive; 0 otherwise
+ Annual report
(Oliveira et al., 2011)
   Corporate governance 
robusteness
Level of compliance with corporate governance 
recomendations
+ Annual report form CMVM/CNMV
(Taylor et al., 2010)
Panel B: Control variables
   Profitability Return on investment ratio = Earnings before 
taxes to total assets
? Annual report
   Company risk Beta risk ? Annual report form CMVM/CNMV
   External auditor quality Dummy variable = 1 if auditing firm is a BIG4; 0 
otherwise
? Annual report
(Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Oliveira et al., 2011)
(Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 
2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Buckby et al., 2015; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015)
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Table 3 – Frequencies of risk-related disclosures by risk category 
OPR EMP IT INT STR
All sample 1,476 587 24 67 916 735 3,805
% 38.8 15.4 0.6 1.8 24.1 19.3 100.0
Portugal 665 255 17 42 527 341 1,847
% 36.0 13.8 0.9 2.3 28.5 18.5 100.0
Spain 811 332 7 25 389 394 1,958
% 41.4 17.0 0.4 1.3 19.9 20.1 100.0
Mann-Whitney U test 420.5 415.0 429.5 410.5 437.5 437.0 450.0
Wilcoxon W 885.5 880.0 894.5 875.5 902.5 902.0 915.0
Z -0.436 -0.519 -0.488 -0.678 -0.185 -0.193 0.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.663 0.604 0.626 0.498 0.853 0.847 1.000
Non-financial riskFinancial 
risk
Total
Notes: OPR = operational risk; EMP = empowerment risk; IT = information and technology risk; INT = integrity
risk; STR = strategic risk
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Table 4 – Frequencies and differences in the mean values of risk-related sentence 
attributes  
Panel A: Frequencies for each sentence attributes
Impact
Positive 98 89 21 62 77 27
Negative 357 496 85 117 272 379
Normal 1,392 1,373 559 632 833 741
Time Horizon
Past 788 1,106 283 441 505 665
Future 236 149 48 33 188 116
Neutral 823 703 334 337 489 366
Quantification
Monetary 78 159 44 121 34 38
Non-monetary 1,769 1,799 621 690 1,148 1,109
Panel B: Differences in means 
Impact
Positive - Negative -8.63 ** -13.57 ** -2.13 ** -1.83 ** -6.50 ** -11.73 **
Time Horizon
Past - Future 18.40 ** 31.90 ** 7.83 ** 13.60 ** 10.57 ** 18.30 **
Quantification
Monetary - Non-monetary -56.37 ** -54.67 ** -19.23 ** -18.97 ** -37.13 ** -35.70 **
FR NFR
Notes: Differences statistically significant at: **0.01, and *0.05 levels (2-tailed), respectively. Wilcoxon test are used to test the
differences in means.
Portugal Spain
RRD
Portugal Spain Portugal Spain
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Table 5 – Evolution of Gross Domestic Product 
Countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Spain 3.09 3.26 3.58 4.08 3.48 0.89 -3.83 -0.2 0.05 -1.64
Portugal -0.91 1.56 0.78 1.45 2.37 -0.01 -2.91 1.9 -1.25 -3.23
Euro Zone 0.76 2.22 1.74 3.27 3.01 0.38 -4.46 1.98 1.61 -0.64
World 2.81 4.19 3.63 4.1 3.98 1.46 -2.09 4.07 2.83 2.38
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Table 6 – Descriptive statistics 
Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation
Total risk disclosures Count 60 63.42 47.27 61.57 43.33 65.27 51.60
Financial risk disclosures Count 60 24.60 25.31 22.17 14.10 27.03 33.05
Non-financial risk disclosures Count 60 38.82 39.33 39.40 40.12 38.23 39.20
Ownership structure Percentage 60 0.55 0.28 0.76 0.11 0.35 0.24
Board size Count 60 11.90 4.55 10.67 5.33 13.13 3.27
Board independence Percentage 60 0.31 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.41 0.19
Board diversity Percentage 60 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.10
Board meetings Count 60 10.27 3.61 10.33 4.05 10.20 3.18
Audit committee independence Percentage 60 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.55 0.28
Audit committee meetings Count 60 6.98 14.68 6.30 20.72 7.67 2.81
Corporate governance robusteness Percentage 60 0.90 0.09 0.90 0.10 0.89 0.07
Leverage Ratio 60 0.40 0.19 0.45 0.18 0.34 0.20
Total assets 100
3
 Euros 60 14,492.35 24,405.52 4,486.83 7,940.17 24,497.87 30,685.93
Total sales 100
3
 Euros 60 7,688.50 13,804.18 2,380.92 4,135.12 12,996.08 17,671.98
Market capitalization 100
3
 Euros 60 5,365.92 10,206.16 1,536.11 2,690.20 9,195.72 13,203.77
Profitability Ratio 60 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.16
Company risk Index 60 0.81 0.41 0.86 0.41 0.77 0.40
Legal environment Index 60 66.63 1.91 64.73 0.00 68.52 0.00
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Dual Board Leadership Dummy =1 (Yes) 25 41.70% 15 50.00% 10 33.30%
=0 (No) 35 58.30% 15 50.00% 20 66.70%
Management compensation Dummy =1 (Yes) 19 68.30% 9 30.00% 10 33.30%
=0 (No) 41 31.70% 21 70.00% 20 66.70%
External auditor quality Dummy =1 (Big4) 55 91.70% 15 50.00% 25 83.30%
=0 (No Big4) 5 8.30% 15 50.00% 5 16.70%
Environmental sensitivity Dummy =1 (Yes) 33 55.00% 15 50.00% 18 60.00%
=0 (No) 27 45.00% 15 50.00% 12 40.00%
Spain
Variables Measurement N
All sample Portugal
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Table 7 – Correlation matrix 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Panel A: Coorelation (Pearson) among continuous variables
(1) Total risk disclosures 1.00
(2) Ownership structure 0.16 1.00
(3) Board size 0.20 -0.29 ** 1.00
(4) Board independence 0.22 -0.43 * 0.26 ** 1.00
(5) Board diversity -0.16 -0.22 -0.16 0.12 1.00
(6) Board meetings -0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.15 -0.14 1.00
(7) Audit committee independence 0.16 -0.23 0.32 ** 0.64 * 0.01 -0.08 1.00
(9) Audit committee meetings -0.03 -0.36 * 0.42 * 0.39 * -0.02 0.33 ** 0.47 * 1.00
(10) Corporate governance robusteness 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.21 0.03 -0.05 0.25 0.06 1.00
(11) Leverage -0.11 0.16 0.06 -0.28 ** 0.09 0.30 ** -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 1.00
(12) Size 0.43 * -0.45 * 0.66 * 0.50 * -0.13 0.02 0.28 ** 0.39 * 0.03 -0.12 1.00
(13) Profitability -0.01 -0.32 ** 0.17 0.11 -0.11 0.00 0.15 0.12 -0.14 -0.03 0.29 ** 1.00
(14) Company risk -0.06 0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.21 0.05 -0.19 1.00
(15) Legal environment 0.00 -0.71 * 0.32 ** 0.51 * 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.48 * -0.05 -0.28 ** 0.60 * 0.26 ** -0.12 1.00
Panel B: Correlation (Spearman) between continuous and categorical variables
(16) Dual board leadership -0.09 0.35 * -0.38 * -0.20 -0.04 -0.14 -0.28 ** -0.22 0.05 0.05 -0.22 -0.08 -0.25 -0.17 1.00
(17) Management compensation 0.17 -0.17 0.26 ** 0.23 -0.14 -0.22 0.31 ** 0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.21 -0.13 0.25 0.04 -0.21 1.00
(18) External auditor quality 0.08 0.20 -0.19 -0.17 0.14 0.07 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.23 -0.21 0.07 -0.05 -0.30 ** 0.01 -0.18 1.00
(19) Environmental sensitivity 0.03 -0.05 0.18 -0.03 -0.14 0.11 -0.26 ** 0.06 -0.23 0.02 0.28 ** -0.12 0.25 0.10 -0.26 ** -0.18 -0.03 1.00
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Table 8 – Results of regression analysis 
ES
Intercept 14.902 * -3.543 15.165 *
Ownership structure ? 0.373 ** 0.397 0.197
Board size ? -0.203 -0.063 -0.192
Board independence ? 0.405 †† -0.114 0.308 †
Board diversity + 0.090 0.048 0.010
Board meetings + -0.010 -0.255 0.269 †
Audit committee meetings + -0.094 -0.125 -0.212
Dual board leadership ? -0.448 0.151 -0.609 *
Management compensation ? 0.286 -0.137 0.371
Audit committee independence + -0.296 † 0.050 -0.210
Leverage ? 0.038 -0.074 -0.009
Legal environment + -0.223 †† 0.044 -0.219 †
Size + 0.871 †† 0.433 † 0.879 ††
Environmental sensitivity + -0.193 0.381 -0.633 ††
Corporate governance robusteness + 0.085 -0.027 0.081
Profitability ? 0.026 -0.070 -0.024
Company risk ? -0.252 * -0.232 -0.070
External auditor quality ? 0.199 0.459 -0.112
Model fit:
R
2 0.690 0.369 0.650
Adjusted R
2 0.554 0.107 0.508
F-statistic 5.100 ** 1.409 4.583 **
Durbin-Watson 1.710 2.308 1.873
Max. Value Inflated Factor 4.274 4.274 4.274
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (p-value>0.05) 0.051 0.084 0.050
Notes: Significance at: **0.01, *0.05 levels (2-tailed), respectively.
            Significance at: ††0.01, †0.05 levels (1-tailed), respectively.
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
RRD FR NFR
 
                                                          
[1]
 Following Oliveira et al. (2011) since size variables were highly correlated a principal components 
analysis was applied to extract an index for “size”. All assumptions were assured 
(unidimensionality=91.04%; Cronbach’s α=0.88; Bartlet’s test of sphericity was statistically significant; 
KMO=0.76). The component extracted represents a unique composite size index for each company (Size 
= total assets x 0.959 + total sales x 0.964 + market capitalization x 0.939). 
[2]
 According to Branco et al. (2008) companies belonging to mining, oil and gas, chemicals, construction 
and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other materials, electricity, gas distribution, and 
water were considered environmentally sensitive. 
